Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the only leader to hold ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic for 36 years, has passed away. He was killed in airstrikes on Iranian targets by Israel and the United States on February 28, 2026, as confirmed by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and state media the next day. The result is far more than a simple change in leadership; it will fundamentally destabilize one of the most centralized theocratic systems of government in today’s world.
My experience in researching power transfers across the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa for almost 20 years shows that this transition poses enormous risk to the systemic order. To appreciate that risk requires looking inside and beyond the obituary to examine the structure of Khamenei's creation and the vacuum left by his passing.
Who Was Ali Khamenei and How Did He Consolidate Total Control
In 1989, Khamenei took on the position of Supreme Leader after the passing of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. He had the difficult task of assuming control of a Revolutionary state that was still in shock from the 8 year war with Iraq. The system that would evolve over the next 35 years would be drastically different from what Khomeini left him.
The doctrine of the Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) permits the Supreme Leader authority over the military, judiciary, state media, Guardian Council, Expediency Board, and the presidency. Khamenei used each aspect of the Constitutional framework to consolidate his power. He turned the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into an alternative state by creating a network of economic empires, violating economic sanctions, and building a regional proxy military presence using groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.
His governing style heavily focused on the idea of calculated factionalism through the use of reformists versus hardliners and moderates versus conservatives while always casting himself as the one between the two that was necessary to have peace. This managed rivalry concept created his ability to stay in power. This same idea will lead to the eventual instability of Iran as soon as the hand that was managing these rival factions is taken away the rival factions no longer negotiate with each other but rather compete with each other with no restrictions.
The Accelerating Decline Before the Assassination
Before February 28th, Khamenei already showed that his grasp on power was deteriorating. Most media outlets covering this event have failed to present this important historical context.
The very first visible issue concerning Khamenei's declining power occurred with his prostate cancer surgery in 2014. Since then, there have been multiple instances reported that confirm Khamenei's deteriorating cognitive function, including frequent occurrences of incapacitation. For example, during the Twelve-Day War with Israel in June of 2025, credible Western and opposition sources reported that senior military commanders with-held accurate battle-field information from Khamenei, and Majlis Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf assumed the role of commander-in-chief and made most of the important decisions when Khamenei was unreachable for long periods of time.
Iran's economy had collapsed around him in parallel. Inflation reached 49% by September 2025. The rial fell below one million to the dollar. The National Development Fund saw approximately $35 billion diverted to IRGC projects without oversight. IMF projections foresaw GDP contraction of 1.7% in 2025 and 2.8% in 2026. Water shortages led to rotational cutoffs in Tehran. These are not indicators of a functioning state. They are indicators of a state consuming itself.
The December 2025 uprising, which escalated through January 2026, reflected those pressures in their sharpest form. Leaked documents later reviewed by multiple outlets confirmed that Khamenei personally approved an IRGC-led suppression plan that transitioned from law enforcement to armed security operations by January 8, 2026. At least 6,854 people were killed according to human rights monitoring organizations. Protesters openly chanted for Khamenei's death. The regime's legitimacy had reached its lowest point since the 1979 revolution.
Then, on February 28, Israel and the United States acted.
The Constitutional Succession Process and Its Real-World Complications
The Iranian constitution is rather precise on paper; as defined in Article 111, in the case of death or removal of the Supreme Leader from office, an immediate meeting of the Assembly of Experts will take place to replace that leader. On March 1, 2026, a court of three men was formed that includes the President, Masoud Pezeshkian, the head judge, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejehi, and an agent of the Guardianship Council, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi. Between them, they will act as heads of the executive branch of Iran until the official succession is completed.
While the constitution clarifies the process, it does not clearly state how this process will work structurally. In 1989, after Ayatollah Khomeini's death, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had the reputation and power to influence the system through the application of the law away from the true religious leader of the country, i.e., a Grand Ayatollah or in this case, Ali Khamenei, who was not a Grand Ayatollah. Mr. Rafsanjani died in 2017 and at this time, there are no individuals known to have the same level of influence on the country.
Khamenei had privately designated 3 clerics as candidates for succession in case he dies: Gholam Hossein Mohseni Eje'i; Asghar Hejazi and Hassan Khomeini (the founder's grandson). The New York Times reported this list following strikes on February 28th. His son Mojtaba has also been mentioned in connection with succession but Ali Khamenei is said to be opposed to hereditary succession.
Each of the above-mentioned candidates carries with them substantial disadvantages. Hassan Khomeini was disqualified from running in 2016 for the Assembly of Experts and continues to be largely excluded from the inner circle of the regime. Mohseni-Eje'i has credibility within the establishment, but no ability to command factional loyalty from the IRGC, the clerical establishment in Qom, and the reformist bloc simultaneously. The IRGC, having gained independent political and economic power over the years, will likely want to play a significant role in the selection and limitation of whomever succeeds Khamenei.
Iran's Fractured Power Centers and the Risk of Institutional Breakdown
My analysis differs from the more positive views that are expressed throughout the Western world. The death of Khamenei will create a struggle between long established institutions since each institution has spent decades creating parallel institutions in preparation for this point in time.
The presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its economic cartels dominate large portions of the sanctions-era Iranian economy as well as Ministries of Intelligence with their independent domestic surveillance and enforcement capabilities; and a large number of clerical networks located in Qom and Mashhad that control their own independent financial resources and have competing bases of religious authority; and a reformist political class that despite being violently repressed still exists.
After the June 2025 war, the former President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, made public appeals for institutional reform, while his successor (Ali Larijani) was appointed by Khamenei himself to be the head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), immediately indicating to others within his faction and those not in his faction that new appointments will be made to represent his policies.
Men like Rouhani and Pezeshkian are warning of the dangers resulting from harm done to Khamenei causing rival factions to engage in open conflict which could result in a regime collapse without an outside adversary taking action; and therefore, provide the Iranian people with the ability to exercise their own choice in determining the future of Iran if the political/economic structures within Iran continue to degrade.
What This Means for Iran's Nuclear Program, Regional Proxy Network, and Sanctions Architecture
The geopolitical implications will have ramifications that reach well beyond Tehran.
Iran's nuclear program has already sustained significant damage from U.S attacks during the 2025 conflict and is now facing a gap in its governance at a time when decisions about compliance, concealment or renegotiation are at their most critical. No interim council will carry the same degree of legitimacy necessary to authorize major strategic level commitments regarding the nuclear file as does a current Supreme Leader. Foreign parties will have to await developments.
The regional proxy network, the Axis of Resistance framework that Khamenei has spent decades cultivating through relationships with Hezbollah, Shia militias, Houthis, and Palestinian groups, faces the greatest test ever of its institutional coherence. Khamenei's relationships with these proxies provided them with funding, arms, and political legitimacy. The continued coherence of this network will depend on whether Khamenei's successor can command the same degree of loyalty and whether IRGC Quds Force commanders attempt to operate independently within these networks.
With regards to sanctions, the succession creates considerable uncertainty regarding any diplomatic outreach. Nuclear negotiations that began during the Biden administration became impasse. The Trump administration implemented maximum pressure on Tehran. Regardless of which individual becomes Supreme Leader, they will need to assert authority internally before any credible external diplomatic negotiations can occur.
The Iranian Opposition and Why Jubilation Is Not a Strategy
Many Iranian exiles are politically divided; many are waiting for an effective leadership; few will support the Pahlavi restoration of the Iranian monarchy. Many of the exiled Iranian leaders and politicians are foreign funded and historically have not had a good track record with any of the countries of the Mideast region. It is possible in the future to have a new Iranian governing body (hopefully not a military one); however, it seems more likely that the IRGC will be given authority over the government at this point and will consolidate all power.
The analysts at CFR have indicated another possible scenario is that the Iranian government could use the moderate Khomeini to give it some domestic legitimacy as it keeps the hardline establishment [Khamenei’s former allies] in operational control. If Hassan Khomeini is present at the February 2026 crucial revolutionary event where a new Supreme Leader is chosen, it would appear he is a likely candidate to assume the office at that time.
Tonight, in the streets of Tehran, there are people celebrating, but all those who are celebrating have been fired on by the state in those streets, just like six weeks ago when they were firing on these people. Their aspirations are legitimate, but their ability to implement those political aspirations through institutions (government) is still hampered by the ability of the security forces of the state to still function in a cohesive manner.
Historical Precedent and What the 1989 Transition Does Not Tell Us
Institutionally speaking, all analyses up to now have only one reference point: the 1989 succession. It was a relatively straightforward process in that it resulted in Khamenei ascending to power as a result of Rafsanjani’s political skill in only a matter of days. Presently, however, there are no longer conditions in place that would provide for such a rapid and relatively orderly succession.
In 1989, the IRGC was not yet an autonomous political and economic entity. The clerical community in Qom did not have to go through a significant level of political vetting. The Assembly of Experts still consisted of predominantly serious members of the clerical establishment; today, the membership consists almost entirely of political loyalists. In 2026, none of these factors will be present.
The comparison of the succession process starting today with the post-Stalin leadership struggle within the Soviet Union in 1953 will have more similarities than the difference between the Khomeini to Khamenei succession process. There was a vast number of years between when Stalin died and Khrushchev seized control, and the struggle for power involved a significant amount of internal violence. The institutions in Iran will be less resilient than the Party was in 1953; upon the time when Iran is pressured militarily from without, the military pressure will be much greater at that time than at this current time.